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Reclaiming Bowlby’s Contribution to Psychoanalysis

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Introduction

Attachment theory was formulated in order to achieve greater coherence and accuracy in describing and explaining observations made in the clinical and empirical settings. Bowlby used attachment theory as a convenient term to include a wide range of theoretical postulates as well as clinical and empirical observations. There is more to attachment theory than just a theory of attachment ties across the life span. Bowlby developed a new theory of motivation that includes affects, cognitive appraisals, control systems and memory systems, developed and mobilized to support and sustain attachment ties. Bowlby also sketched an information processing approach toward understanding defensive processes to explain the psychological mechanisms that come into play when there is trauma or loss of these affectional ties or there is neglect or rejection by attachment figures.

This article is organized in three parts. In part I we review central concepts of attachment theory. In part two we address why the psychoanalytic community initially ignored Bowlby’s work1 while his work was being productively tested and developed by developmental psychologists (Hinde, Ainsworth, Main, Sroufe, Belsky etc.) and by social psychologists (for a review of the social psychology literature see Shaver & Mikulincer 2002). In part three we examine some of the reasons behind the dramatic change of opinion among many psychoanalysts and clinicians in favor of attachment theory. This change is particularly evident in the United States, although in many parts of Europe Bowlby’s work still remains relatively unknown within the psychoanalytic community.

Part 1: Key points in attachment theory

Attachment theory is a theory of normal developmental processes and of psychopathology

The heart of attachment theory consists in recognizing the critical importance of the attachment relationships and the secure base phenomena throughout development. (Sroufe, 1996; Waters & Cummings 2000). Ainsworth (1978) observed that children use attachment figures as a base from which to explore their surroundings. Establishing a secure base is the most important developmental milestone of early childhood. By virtue of its central role in protecting against danger, the attachment relationship establishes an early sense of security and trust in others. The attachment relationship also penetrates all the important developmental issues of early childhood such as emotional regulation, the regulation of arousal levels and the freedom to explore the

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1 There are now some excellent reviews of attachment theory that offer a good analysis of this shameful neglect (Eagle 1984, 1995; Holmes 1995; Karen 1998; Mitchell 2000; Slade 2000; Fonagy 2001).
world (Sroufe 1996). Finally the attachment relationship establishes early unconscious (subsymbolic) models of self and others; under optimal conditions „I am lovable others are trustworthy”. Longitudinal research has shown that the freedom to explore the world, the ability to moderate impulses, to handle stress and change, or the capacity for establishing good peer relations or intimate relations all build on the foundation of a secure base with attachment figures (for reviews see Sroufe 1996; Thompson 1999; Sroufe, Egeland & Carlson, 1999; Cortina 1999; Cassidy 2001).

Although developing a secure base in early childhood is a foundation for a sense of security, new developmental tasks build on this foundation. By middle school, peer relations, athletic and academic competence, competition and/or cooperation with siblings become new sources of security (or insecurity). During adolescence identification with peer groups, incipient romantic relationships and physical appearance can become all consuming issues. In early adulthood the selection of a vocation or career path, the capacity to develop intimate relations and the consolidation of identity take front and center as key developmental tasks (Erikson 1950; Sroufe 1990b and Waters and Cummings 2000). Furthermore, all these developmental sources of security and insecurity are played out in the context of specific economic conditions, social institutions and belief systems (religious and secular) that define the limits and possibilities for development.

Our point is that while Bowlby’s theory is a base for understanding the origin of security and anxiety, to develop a broader view of the sources of security (or insecurity) in life, we also need models of development envisioned by psychoanalytic pioneers such as Erik Erikson (1950), Fromm and Maccoby (1970) and psychologists as Bronfenbrenner (1979) that view development as the product of complex interactions between individuals within specific social, economic and cultural contexts (Gojman & Millan 2003; Cicchetti & Nurcombe, 1998). New developmental tasks are constrained or enhanced by prior development and by the social surround. This broad perspective from which to look at the importance on attachment relationships was perfectly congenial to Bowlby (see below).

Bowlby’s point of departure was based on observing young children’s reactions to relatively brief separations from their attachment figures. The observation of the sequence of protest and anger, despair and detachment became the bases for developing attachment theory and reconceptualizing some of Freud’s astute clinical observations made during the course of his career. Freud first encountered the problem of defence in his cases of hysteria. It was much later in „Mourning and Melancholia” that he tried to conceptualize loss and it was not until „Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” that he came full circle to the problems of separation anxiety and attachment. As Bowlby noted, in „Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” Freud had sketched a new route: „Anxiety is the danger of losing the object, the pain of mourning the reaction to the actual loss of the object, and defense a mode of dealing with anxiety and pain (Bowlby 1973, p. 29). Freud, working retrospectively with clinical populations, had gone from defence, to loss and separation, to attachment, whereas as Bowlby, looking at the same phenomena developmentally and prospectively, went in reverse order: from attachment, to separation and loss, and finally to defence. Indeed, the best way to understand Bowlby’s trilogy on Attachment (1988) Separation (1973) and Loss (1980), is to see these three volumes as a development of this central insight.

Bowlby used the concept of developmental pathways, proposed by the biologist C.H. Waddington (1957) to understand normal and pathological development. He eschewed concepts of „regression” and „fixation” rooted in Freudian metapsychology and mechanistic conceptions of fixed developmental stages. From a developmental pathway perspective, human personality is viewed as a system that develops unceasingly along one or another of an array of possible and discrete pathways. Some pathways are optimal and promote resilience to future adversity in life. Other pathways are sub-optimal and promote vulnerability to life stressors. Pathways are
Attachment theory is a theory of motivation

Bowlby’s revision of Freud’s theory of motivation consisted of two parts. First, Bowlby, like many other major psychoanalytic innovators, rejected Freud’s mechanistic tension-reduction concepts of libido and psychic energy. Second, Bowlby moved beyond Freud’s dualistic theory of motivation (sexual versus self-preservation drives) and in a later version, Eros versus the death instinct). Bowlby thought that attachment, caregiving and exploration were closely linked and functioned as separate motivational systems. Without minimizing the importance of sexuality and aggression, attachment theory helps us look at aggression and sexuality in perspective. For instance, in normal circumstances, anger and protest (aggression) serve an important adaptive function of preserving attachment ties (the “anger of hope” as Bowlby aptly put it). Bowlby (1988) regretted that he had not been able to address the relation between attachment and sexuality, but hoped that this important issue would be tackled in the future (for some current attempts of integration see Gale & Schane 2003; Silverman 2003).

However, by describing attachment as a behavioral system, Bowlby inadvertently contributed to the failure of many psychoanalysts to see that he was providing a new theory of motivation based on control theory and ethological concepts rather than on Freud’s dated theory of drives based on atavistic impulses and psychic energy. While Bowlby often described attachment as a behavioral system, he also described attachment as instinctive source of motivation, and the attachment relationship as an affectional tie. Of course, attachment is all the above, but we believe it is best conceptualized as a motivational system. The following remarks may clarify this point. During childhood seeking protection is regulated interpersonally by the attachment figure. Developmentally interpersonal regulation shifts gradually toward self-regulation. Felt security or insecurity are organismic signals that evaluate whether internal and external conditions require the activation of the attachment system and is greatly influenced by the models of self and others that are gradually constructed based on experience (representational models of self and others). To put it in Bowlby’s terms, felt security is part of a goal corrected control system that is comprised of cognitive appraisals in regard to the availability and responsiveness of attachment figures. Control systems operate mainly at unconscious levels and functions to elicit care in moments of distress. It is important to note, however, that control systems that regulate fear reactions can become activated even before the felt phase becomes conscious, as LeDoux’s (1996) has elegantly shown. Seeking physical proximity to attachment figures (through behavior) is a means to achieve the goal of felt security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977). Support for this view is based on the common observation that the need for physical proximity in young children will change from moment to moment according to appraisals of danger. Behaviors change. What remains constant is the felt need for security. Attachment behaviors also change dramatically through development.

What has been selected through evolution are not discrete behavioral systems, but functional adaptive systems (new phenotypes) such as intensive parental care and the use of an attachment figure from which to explore the world. New phenotypes (neophenotypes) are the product of complex gene-environmental interactions (coactions) that come together during the
course of ontogenetic development (Cortina 1996; Gottlieb 1997). In other words, neophenotypes (based on developmental innovations) are the „unit” of selection as far as the attachment system is concerned. This developmental unit is comprised of organismic signals (emotions), control systems, appraisal processes, memory and behavior systems. Behavioral systems are just one of the important components of this evolutionary-developmental matrix. For all these reasons, we believe it is better to think of attachment as being part of a developmental-motivational system than it think of it as being primarily a behavioral system.

As a motivational system, attachment has to be distinguished from its complement, the caregiving system (Heard & Lake 1997; George & Soloman 1999). The attachment and the caregiving systems constitute the attachment relationship. Attachment also has to be distinguished from exploration and competence, from sexuality, from physiologic needs like hunger and thirst and from what Lichtenberg (1989) calls the aversive (fight/flight) system and attachment theory calls the fear system. Bleichmar (2003) conceptualizes the desire to be validated and recognized by the other as separate person, yet simultaneously feel united and whole by this recognition as a separate motivational system—traditionally is thought as normal narcissism within psychoanalysis. Liotti and Intreccialagii (2003) describe several interpersonal motivational systems, that include the attachment and caregiving systems, but they add a competitive or agonistic system and the cooperative system to their interpersonal set of motivational systems. We think that the need for affiliation to a social group beyond the attachment to family members is also a basic feature of the human condition. During 99% of the history of our species, human societies were organized in the form of small bands of hunters and gatherers. Selective pressures at the group level may have led the genetic fixation of behavioral adaptations such as cooperation and altruism.3 Bowlby was very enthusiastic about the idea of affiliation to groups (personal communication with Mario Marrone) and thought that the idea was consistent with the evolutionary framework of attachment theory.

Depending on the appraisal of environmental conditions and inner states, motivational systems may be activated or deactivated sequentially. For instance, a state of felt security (that deactivates the attachment system) may activate exploration and play. Or a threat to the attachment system may activate the aversive (fight/flight) system. Some motivational systems may also be activated defensively. Exploration can be used to defend against the need for comfort (as in avoidant attachment strategies). The sexual system can be used defensively to defend against the threat of intimacy (Bleichmar 2003; Silverman 2003). It remains to be seen if future developmental, clinical or biological research will support some of these ideas in regard to distinct but interrelated motivational systems. For now, the best tested of these motivational systems has been the attachment system and the intimately associated caregiving, exploratory and fight/flight systems.

In emphasizing attachment as a motivational system, we do not mean to imply that Ainsworth’s or Bowlby’s attention to behavior was misguided. Quite the contrary, attachment theory draws strength from behavioral observations made by ethologists of attachment behavior in nonhuman primates and by developmental psychologists of attachment behavior in humans. The Robertson’s observations on the effects of separations of young children from their parents and the enormous wealth of naturalistic observations made by Ainsworth in Uganda and in

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2 The organism is not the only level at which selective pressures operate. Selective pressures can operate at sub-organismic levels (genes) or supra-organismic levels (groups, species and clades). An example of selection at the level of genes is the production of so called junk DNA. Altruism is an example of selection operating at the level of groups. Language may be an example of selection operating at a species level. For a contemporary discussion of these issues see Sober and Wilson 1998 and Gould 2002

3 Cooperative groups with altruistic members will compete for resources with other groups that may be less cooperative or altruistic (see Sober and Wilson, 1998 for a masterful rehabilitation of this group selection hypothesis).
Baltimore have also played an immense role in the development of attachment theory. However, the strength of attachment theory has always been to infer the meaning of any given behavior according to its relational, developmental and cultural context rather than assume that similar behaviors have similar meanings (regardless of context) or that attachment behaviors will remain unchanged throughout development.

**Attachment theory is a relational theory of socio-psychological interactions.**

Bowlby clearly understood that attachment relationships do not exist in isolation and that parent-child relationships had to be seen as developing within the broader context of group and family dynamics (personal communication with Mario Marrone). Attachment theory reaffirms a movement from a one-person psychology to a multi-person psychology (Diamond 1994, 1998; Cortina 2000). There has been a misconception that attachment theory merely reflects a dyadic or two-person psychology model. Bowlby thought that dyadic relationships do not take place in a vacuum; they take place in a socio-cultural context. In discussions he held with Earl Hopper at the Institute of Group Analysis in London (Marrone, 1998, pp. 28-29), Bowlby made it clear that attachment theory was compatible with the socio-cultural school of psychoanalysis. Individuals can only be understood as part of an interactional web that involves families, social and cultural institutions as well as economic realities (Erikson 1950; Fromm & Maccoby 1970, Gojman & Millán 2003).

**Attachment theory is a theory of the encoding and representation of experience within different memory systems**

Parent-child international patterns become internal structures (*internal working models*) with organizing functions over the psychological, psychosomatic and psychosocial life of the individual. Bowlby’s concept of internal working models is an alternative to concepts such as mental representations, internal objects, introjection and internalization. Building on Tulving’s (1972) work on memory systems, Bowlby pointed out that memory could be stored *semantically* as general propositions about self and others (I am lovable, significant others are trustworthy) and *episodically* as memories of specific biographical episodes. Clinically, this distinction is very important. What a child is told about specific events or interactions (“I am only doing this for your own good”) and the child’s own experience of the event or interaction might be quite different. What a parent might label as “good” may be based on his or her need for control. Hence, the child will experience “being good” as oppressive. Because experience is encoded and stored semantically and episodically, some children grow up with two very different and contradictory IWM: what they *actually* experienced (usually a weak IWM) and what they are told they *should* experience (usually a dominant IWM). Further developments in the field of cognitive science made it clear that experience is also stored at least at two levels: the subsymbolic level (procedural or implicit memory) and the symbolic levels (declarative or explicit memory). We now have to add to Bowlby’s concept of IWM the idea that IWM can be encoded at subsymbolic (nonrepresentational) levels and symbolic (representational) levels (Cortina, 2001, 2003; Knox, 2003).

**Attachment theory is a theory of anxiety**

Bowlby supported the view that the main source of anxiety in childhood is the threat of losing an attachment figure. This view contrasts with Freud’s first theory of anxiety, that understood anxiety as originating from the build up of libido, but is consistent with Freud’s (1926) signal theory of anxiety. In this second theory, anxiety is triggered whenever individuals assess a current situation as being reminiscent of a previous experience in which they felt helpless (a danger situation). In early childhood, the most common situation leading to a sense of danger and
helplessness is an unexpected separation or loss of an attachment figure. This view, central to attachment theory, contrasts with the Kleinian view that the main source of anxiety is fundamentally internal and arises out of the threat posed by the death instinct and its derivatives. Bowlby’s theory of anxiety has been usefully elaborated by Main (2000a, 2000b). Main makes a distinction between fear with solution observed within the organized (secure and insecure) patterns of attachment and fear without solution (that leads to a temporary breakdown of organization), and is observed within the disorganized patterns of attachment.

**Attachment theory offers a good base from which to develop a general theory of affects and emotions**

According to Bowlby, some of the strongest and most significant emotions are rooted in and linked to attachment-relevant events, such as the formation, break-up and renewal of attachment relationships as well as feeling sensitively or insensitively understood and responded to. Attachment figures have a major role to play in the early regulation of affects and arousal levels in young children and allow for the gradual expression of strong positive and negative emotions and the gradual capacity to engage in exploration of novel situations without becoming overstimulated (Sroufe, 1996). Cortina (2003) and Liotti & Intreccialagli (2003) note that some emotions are often associated with specific motivational systems like the exploratory, sexual, alarm (fight/flight) systems, the need for intimacy (Bleichmar) or the agonistic or ranking system (Liotti & Intreccialagli). These different motivational systems may or may not be linked with the attachment and caregiving systems. But the emotional responses associated with the activation of these motivational systems serve the function of subjectively monitoring the goal-corrected aims inherent in each of these motivational systems. As Bleichmar (2003) and Cortina (2003) point out, emotions also have an expressive as well as an inductive function that may promote intimacy and communication as well as „contagious” qualities that produce a sense of merger with the other (Bleichmar 2003).

**Attachment theory is a theory of defence**

Attachment theory bases its theory of defence on well established and commonly agreed upon psychoanalytic principles and observations. It proposes that unconscious defences against anxiety and painful affects are rooted in interpersonal events and that defence mechanisms influence a person’s interpersonal modes of relating. It also suggests that defence mechanisms and attachment strategies shape a person’s character defences, e.g., the way an individual regulates felt security and optimal proximity to significant others. In this respect, attachment theory bears a strong resemblance to Sullivan’s interpersonal theory (for instance, Sullivan’s concept of security operations, Cortina 2001). Defensive processes operate at many levels. Defensive processes can skew internal working models toward rigid and inflexible models. Particularly in cases involving trauma, incompatible and contradictory IWM of attachment figures might remain segregated by defensive processes (Bowlby 1980). Defensive processes involving trauma might also disrupt a sense of cohesive bodily self and of agency (Diamond, 2003). Defensive processes may uncouple cognitive, emotional and motivational systems that are normally linked together (Cortina 2003).

**Attachment theory is a theory of the self**

Allan Sroufe (Sroufe & Waters: Sroufe 1990b) has proposed an organizational model of the self in which the attachment relationship is seen as the most important organizer of early experience. The model holds the view that a person’s capacity to view himself as a separate individual, with an optimal and realistic self-esteem, capable of maintaining a state of relative internal integration, self-regulation or cohesiveness, is normally based upon an optimal or secure attachment history. Dissociative states of the self are—by and large—the result of early traumas in attachment.
relationships (Liotti & Intrequilaglo 2003) and Diamond 2003).

**Attachment theory is a theory that explains the intergenerational transmission of attachment patterns**

Parental functions are organized by the parent’s own internal working models, which in turn were formed under the influence of their own parents internal working models. There is now robust empirical support for this hypothesis (Van Uzendoorn 1995). For instance, one study using three way comparison between infant and adult categories found a 65 % transmission of attachment patterns across three generations (Benoit & Parker 1994, also see Part III of this chapter).

**Part 2: Why was Bowlby’s contribution initially ignored or rejected?**

From its inception, psychoanalysis lacked a good theory of normal development. This deficiency has hindered its efforts in developing a better understanding of the processes that lead to deviations from normal development as well as efforts to understand the self-righting potential that we support in the psychoanalytic process. Maladaptive developmental pathways provide the fertile ground from which psychopathology will flourish. The central subject matter of psychoanalysis has always been an understanding of demonic forces that haunt the human soul. It was Freud’s great discovery that most of these demonic forces operated at unconscious levels. By shedding light and meaning into the dark recesses of the human mind, Freud hoped to liberate the human spirit from bondage. „Where id was, there ego shall be” became the rallying cry and the raison d’être of the psychoanalytic movement. As Freud grappled with these demonic forces in his patients, he courageously tried to come to terms with his own demons. It was here that Freud got off to a bad start from which we are still trying to recover 100 years later.

In his self-analysis, Freud misconceived his need for affectional ties to his mother (and to attachment figures in general) as sexual in nature. Why this gross misconception? Freud was traumatized by catastrophic events in his early childhood. His mother was mourning the loss of her brother Julius, who died at age 20 from tuberculosis just before she gave birth to her second son, named after her deceased brother. Sigmund (the first born) was two years old when his infant brother Julius died from an intestinal infection. Six more babies’ followed before Sigmund was 10 years old. On top of that, Freud lost his nursemaid at age two and a half (she was caught stealing and sent to jail) and his father lost his business around this time and had to move his family from Freiberg to Vienna. As a consequence of this move Freud also lost his first playmates. Freud himself considered this move catastrophic for the family. The combination of the mother grieving fresh losses, the loss of his nursemaid, his mother having one baby after another and the collapse of his father’s business must have combined to overwhelm little “Sigi” with grief, fear and sadness (Breger, 2000). Freud’s travel phobia, originated from this traumatic move from Freiberg to a poor ghetto in Vienna lasted all his life.

In his excellent biography of Freud, Louis Breger (2000) makes the case that Freud defended himself from the impact of these early traumas by means of a brilliant but idiosyncratic interpretation of Oedipus Rex. Freud’s interpretation of the Oedipal myth served as a „cover story” that concealed a hidden plot: the catastrophic events of his early childhood. By interpreting the child’s tie to attachment figures as being sexual, Freud is able to make the little boy more adult-like, an erotic rival for his mother’s affection rather than a dependent and vulnerable child. Throughout his career, Freud continued to confuse and conflate two very different motivational systems: the affectional tender feelings emanating from the attachment system, and the erotic feelings emanating from the sexual system. This was a veritable „confusion of tongues” as Ferenczi (1933) put it. This confusion of tongues seriously limited Freud’s clinical approach, as was noted by Ferenczi in his analysis with Freud:
My own analysis could not be pursued deeply enough because my analyst (by his own admission of a narcissistic nature) with his strong determination to be healthy and his antipathy toward any weakness and abnormality, could not follow me into those depths (Ferenczi 1932, p. 62).

Ferenczi’s observations are consistent with Breger’s interpretation. With the exception of a few charismatic friends and close confidants like Fleischl, Flies and Jung, whom he initially idealized and then rejected; Freud rarely allowed himself to feel vulnerable in intimate relationships. Instead he identified with towering intellectual figures like Leonardo Da Vinci and with conquistadors and adventurers like Oedipus and Alexander the Great and Hannibal. The end result of this tortuous history is that Freud projected into children the psychopathology he observed in himself and in his adult patients. Consequently, children began to be seen as harboring incestuous and murderous impulses, a psychoanalytic version of the Augustinian doctrine of Man’s inherent evilness.

Melanie Klein, an enormously influential figure in the psychoanalytic world, also experienced multiple losses and had depressive tendencies (see Grosskurth, 1987). Her tendency to dismiss the importance of the impact of real life events during development might have been an unconscious defence against her own pain. The developmental histories of Freud and Klein support Hamilton’s (1985) contention that the main reason Bowlby’s work was ignored stems from the fact that attachment theory specifically addresses issues of trauma, separation and loss. These memories engender enormous pain, fright and helplessness, and frequently become repressed or dissociated. With a few notable exceptions, the psychoanalytic community colluded for too long in ignoring the reality of the maltreatment and neglect of children. This has not only been reflected in theory, but also in the tendency to confine analytic explorations to the here-and-now, to the neglect of the patient’s attachment history. Bowlby believed that an analyst who rigidly confines his work to the here-and-now, invalidates the patient’s account of negative experiences in childhood and leaves the patient alone to deal with his plight. Having sought therapy, and feeling left alone once again, the patient further withdraws into his shell. Bowlby thought that a patient is more likely to shut off from consciousness painful events of his past than to invent events that never happened. (personal communication with Mario Marrone. See Cortina and Marrone (2003) for further discussion of this issue.

The tendency to conceptualize normal development based on clinical reconstructions with patients

The tendency of skewing normal development toward pathology has been ubiquitous in most psychoanalytic theorizing. This was probably unavoidable. Early pioneers had to build theory from somewhere and the only data at hand were their own personalities (Atwood and Stolorow, 1999) and clinical observations with patients, whom of course, come to the consulting room with emotional troubles. Because the study of early development was basically made retrospectively with clinical populations, development was impregnated with language taken from psychopathology. The pathologizing of normality was most evident with early Kleinian thinking, even though Klein added a matricentric twist to Freud’s patriarchal views that emphasized the rivalry between the father and son as a key to understanding neurosis. In order to maintain the attachment with mother, Klein’s infant has to split their desire for care into a good mother/good object, and their destructive and greedy impulses into a bad mother/bad object (the paranoid-schizoid position). It is only after the mothering figure can contain and “metabolize” these destructive impulses that infants can integrate these split off imagos (the depressive position) and achieve a sense of wholeness. Colwyn Trevarthen, a distinguished infant researcher, believes that the Kleinian retrospective view of infancy corresponds to that of a traumatized child. Research based on normal development does not validate this view of infancy (personal communication...
to Mario Marrone).

It is against this historical backdrop that we can begin to understand the utter incomprehension and hostility that was directed at Bowlby’s contribution, particularly among his Kleinian colleagues. In the late 1950’s Bowlby gave a brilliant series of papers to the British Psychoanalytic Society which had a particularly negative reception from most of his colleagues (see Bretherton, 1991, pp. 17-18; Marrone, 1998, pp. 25-26).4

At the time Bowlby gave these papers it was an absolute requirement that authors declared their debt to Freud and trace connections between Freud's work and their own (Arden 2001). It was unacceptable to disagree with Freud beyond certain limits without risking becoming a psychoanalytic pariah. Those who dared to questioned established theory were considered to be „in need of further analysis“. As Kernberg (1993) points out, by and large, the organization of psychoanalytic institutes has supported the establishment of party lines and has conspired against psychoanalytic programs becoming educational institutions that foster a spirit of free inquiry.5

What was Bowlby’s response to this form of idolatry? Bowlby thought Freud was a great explorer and innovator and that psychoanalysis was on to all the right questions. But he believed there was a huge gap between the brilliant clinical observations made by psychoanalysis and the theory that was used to explain these observations. He believed that the best way to honor Freud was to take a critical look at his work and build a better framework to address the clinical issues Freud had grappled with. Bowlby always considered himself a psychoanalyst and believed that his work was in keeping with the best psychoanalytic tradition. He was baffled when his psychoanalytic colleagues rejected his work as not being psychoanalytic.

Bowlby described himself as a „plunger“ who had dared to plunge into new territory in order to provide better explanations of clinical phenomena. He admitted to struggling to overcome his fears in order to take the bold steps toward a new theory which involved areas like ethology and cybernetics, where he considered himself an amateur (comments made at University of Virginia conference in 1985). It was only later that his bold ideas found empirical support. Bowlby emphasized the enormous importance of this phase of exploration in his career. He pointed out that his ideas had not come out ready-made, like Athena emerging from the head of Zeus.

Bowlby’s view of infancy and the nature of the infant’s tie to his mother offered a radically different view from those of Freud and Klein. Like most contemporary models of development (Stern 1985, Emde 1988), Bowlby saw young children as being biologically prepared to interact with primary caregivers. Bowlby’s „adapted infant“ does not possess the mental abilities to perform the complex defence mechanisms envisioned by Klein. The Kleinian School treated phantasies as if they were „hard wired“ (preformed) and only needed the experience of frustration to emerge in full form (the „phantasmagoric infant“). Bowlby was very critical of this „autonomous“ view of phantasy, but he did not discard the concept of phantasy. He regarded phantasy as a way of making sense of interpersonal experience (personal communication with Mario Marrone) but insisted that it was necessary to pay close attention to actual events, which were the base from which phantasy was elaborated. Infants do not posse the elaborate capacity for imagination envisioned by Klein which cannot be part of the developmental repertoire of infants until children are about three-years old (see Cortina and Knox in this volume for further discussion of these issues). The ethologically based model used by Bowlby to understand the nature if an infant’s tie to attachment figures belonged to a different universe than the one

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4 These papers where published in the late fifties and early sixties (Bowlby 1958, 1960a, 1960b) and became the basis of his trilogy on Attachment (1969), Separation (1973) and Loss (1980).
5 Kernberg (1993) names several factors that have contributed to this situation, such as a) the fact that in many institutes the (so called) didactic analyst has a say in whether a candidate will be able to graduate, b) the lock that training analysts have over the organization and who is or isn’t considered legitimate and c) the lack of exposure to research methodologies and empirical studies.
inhabited by his psychoanalytic colleagues. Even an analyst of the stature of Sutherland (who was a close colleague of Bowlby during the Second World War and at the Tavistock clinic) thought that Bowlby's contribution amounted to a "behavioral psychoanalysis" oblivious to the dynamics of the internal world of phantasy. Phantasy was the code word used by Kleinians to describe their vision of the unconscious. Bowlby's views were a direct challenge to this vision; he should not have been surprised by the swift, negative reaction he received from his colleagues.

Luis Juri and Mario Marrone (2003) present a compelling case based on Kuhn's (1962) concept of paradigms for understanding the resistance to attachment theory within the psychoanalytic community. They believe that the revision of psychoanalytic theory proposed by Bowlby is not just a matter of offering a slightly modified view of psychoanalysis. Attachment theory proposes a completely new framework from which to understand clinical and developmental phenomena that has traditionally been interpreted with concepts of drives, libido, cathexis, fixation, regression sublimation and so forth. Attachment theory does not just tinker with different interpretations of clinical phenomena involving loss, separation or trauma, it completely re-conceptualizes how we think and see these phenomena. Any paradigm shift of this magnitude is often met by vigorous and at times vitriolic attacks by people who work within the old paradigm. Appeals to rules of evidence and to normal practices of verification and discourse are often set aside in the heat of battle. It is only after the dust has settled that the logic, reasonableness and necessity of the new paradigm becomes evident. We believe that this description of paradigm shifts is exactly what happened to attachment theory. Which takes us to our next point. What is happening that is allowing the new paradigm of attachment theory to take hold?

Part 3: What has changed that has allowed a favorable reception of Bowlby's ideas?

Several factors have come into play since Bowlby first started publishing his ideas that have dramatically changed the climate of opinion in favor of Bowlby's ideas.

1. Beginning in the 1960's observations and studies carried out by sociologists, social workers, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and family therapists highlighted the significant prevalence of child sexual, physical and emotional abuse and their consequences for later development. Maltreatment of children and family violence could no longer be ignored by clinicians and psychoanalysts. Attention to real events played right into the main strength of attachment theory: its attention to the actuality of children's experience.

2. A new model of development, strongly influenced by empirical research with infants and young children began to take hold. Although assigning a date to this sea change is arbitrary, if forced to pick we would probably say that the publication of Lichtenberg's (1983) Psychoanalysis and Infant Research and Stern's (1985) Interpersonal World of the Infant were definite landmarks. Stern elegantly chronicled the results of this research with infants and began spelling out some of its clinical implications. The research agenda described by Stern was based on what infants could do, rather than focusing on their obvious immaturity. Infant researchers began to recognize the remarkable competencies that infants came equipped with, such as the capacity for cross modal integration of stimuli coming from different sense organs, the capacity to select invariant features that characterized their interaction with caregivers and to generalize these interactions as sub-symbolic schemas of self with others. This is what Stern calls RIG's--representations of interactions that become generalized). All these capacities are performed with minimal capacity to symbolize experience. Stern's RIG's are an almost identical concept to Bowlby's internal working models concept, except that RIG's are encoded at a subsymbolic level of experience. In other words, RIG's are nonrepresentational (implicit or procedural) IWM. This emerging model of development began to undermine the „phantasmagoric infant” ensconced in clinical lore.

3. Simultaneously, with this development, research informed by attachment theory began...
to be disseminated and known and was incorporated in the thinking of some prominent empirically oriented psychoanalysts like Stern, Emde, Eagle and Lichtenberg. Research informed by attachment theory confirmed basic tenets of Bowlby’s ideas, but was compelling in its own right, enriching and expanding attachment theory in new directions. Two important strands of this research agenda are important to mention: the discovery of the basic patterns of attachment by Ainsworth (together with the later discovery of the disorganized pattern) and the development of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI).

Attachment patterns and their impact on social and emotional development

Ainsworth’s et al., (1978) discovery of secure, avoidant and ambivalent patterns of attachment in infancy showed how these basic adaptive relational patterns are constructed in infancy from interactions with primary caregivers. A fourth “pattern” the disorganized/disoriented category (this “pattern” is probably best conceptualized as an added dimension to the basic organized patterns), was discovered within the last 20 years and has more serious pathological implications (Main & Weston 1981; Main & Solomon 1986; see Hesse & Main 2000; and Cassidy and Mohr 2002 for reviews).

The discovery of attachment patterns led to the design of several methodologically sophisticated longitudinal research studies. Key questions in these studies have been to understand how these early relational patterns affect later social and emotional development and understand the continuities or discontinuities of these relational patterns over time. The most ambitious of these studies (now in its third decade) is being carried out at the University of Minnesota by a research team led by Byron Egeland and Alan Sroufe. This research project demonstrates how relational patterns are carried forward as (mostly) unconscious expectations and attitudes in regard to the nature, availability and responsiveness of attachment figures. In turn, unconscious expectations, together with environmental influences, begin to skew development along certain pathways. Pathways based on histories of secure attachment are more likely to promote autonomy and the development of positive relationships with peers and adults than pathways with histories of insecure or disorganized attachment (Sroufe 1996, 1997; Cortina 1999; Wienfield at al., 1999 for reviews).

This carefully crafted research project confirmed, for the first time, what every psychoanalytically informed clinician knows; namely, that relational patterns originating in the past continue to influence behavior and relationships in the present, and that the influences from the past are mostly unconscious. Needless to say, the relational patterns discovered by Ainsworth and Main do not reflect the variety and complexity of patterns observed clinically. It is important to emphasize this point because there is an increasing tendency on the part of some attachment informed clinicians to simplistically cluster their patients into these categories, without taking into account the fact that these categories have been discovered through research and do not reflect the complexity of a patient’s psychic life. However, these categories do point to basic unconscious “strategies”, which emerge from infancy and childhood and continue to organize attachment relationships across the life span. This organization is largely based on representation of experience, that is, on working models of self and others (Bowlby, 1973).

Internal working models become expressed in the form of expectations and attributions of meaning in relation to attachment-relevant events and can influence the development of character-based traits and attitudes. Freud, was the first to understand that “transference” was based on early templates of experience that were carried forward toward important figures in a patient’s present life. See Cortina and Marrone (chapter 2) for further discussion of this issue.

The Adult Attachment Interview

An important strand of research developed as attention became concentrated on the study of
attachment patterns at the „level of representation“ (Main, 1986). Here the research question is how do relational patterns, based on attachment relationships, become represented and how can this process of representation be best captured and studied?

One of the many measures used to study the process of representation is the Adult Attachment Interview (George, Kaplan, and Main, 1985). The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is a clinical semi-structured interview that lasts 60 to 90 minutes. In the interview individuals are asked to describe and evaluate their experience with attachment figures beginning with their earliest memories. Questions regarding experiences of separation, loss and trauma are also part of the interview. Several „states of mind“ in regard to attachment are scored based on the degree of coherence exhibited in the interview (refer to appendix for a description of the AAI categories and the infant attachment categories based on the Strange Situation).

These findings added to previous longitudinal research showing lawful continuities and discontinuities of attachment patterns across the first decades of life by demonstrating an intergenerational transmission of attachment patterns. In other words, parents with autonomous interviews in the AAI are more likely to develop a secure attachment with their infants, whereas parents with dismissive and preoccupied interviews are likely to develop, respectively, avoidant and ambivalent attachment patterns with their infants. The adult U/d category is also empirically linked to the disorganized attachment category of infancy.

These results are again well known to family therapists and clinicians working with children, who see that relational patterns and conflicts running in families are often repeated from one generation to the next.

The relational turn in psychoanalysis

Perhaps a decisive factor in the growing interest in attachment theory within the psychoanalytic community is based on the shift in the center of gravity of psychoanalysis from drive theories to relational theories. No single author or school of thought is responsible for this paradigm shift. It is the result of a collective effort of reform and revision that began from the very inception of psychoanalysis with the first dissidents, Adler and Jung, and has continued unabated, in one form or another, to the present.

Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) depicted this shift in their landmark book Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. Greenberg and Mitchell showed a distinct movement, coming from dissident groups and from within the psychoanalytic mainstream, that began mixing drive theories with object relational concepts (for instance, Melanie Klein, Bion, Kernberg), minimizing or obfuscating differences with drive theories while developing creative departures that were clearly revisionist (Winnicott, Erikson, Kohut, Mahler, Loewald) or abandoning drive theories altogether in favor of „pure“ object relational, interpersonal and multi-motivational theories such as those of Fairbairn, Guntrip, Sullivan, Homey, Fromm, and Bowlby.

More recently, Mitchell (1993, 1997, 2000), Atwood & Stolorow (1993) and Lichtenberg, J. D., Lachmann, F. M & Fosshage (1996), Liotti & Intrecialagli (2003 and Bleichmar, 1997, 2003) among others, have made significant contributions to relational and multi-motivational approaches. In Britain, the emergence of group analysis, pioneered by S.H. Foulkes, has also been a contributing force to the development of a relational theory. Group analysis is not only a method of group psychotherapy but a relational version of psychoanalysis, which sees individual psychological functioning as inseparable from the web of interactions that occur in the group contexts in which every person always lives (Pines, 1990).

In many ways, attachment theory finds itself more at home with these „pure“ relational and multi-motivational approaches even though there are important differences. For instance, most field theories such as Sullivan’s interpersonal theory and Atwood and Stolorow’s intersubjective theory shy away from explicit views on human nature. More significantly interpersonal and intersubjective field theories lack an understanding of the biological roots of human relatedness
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(Cortina, 2001). Bowlby's compelling evolutionary and developmental model of the attachment relationship fills this void. There are also important „points of contact“ between Bowlby’s work and key concepts formulated by authors like Kohut, Winnicott, Erikson and Mahler, who preserve some elements of drive theory while creating new departures from classic psychoanalysis (Marrone 1998; Fonagy 2001). Attachment theory and research, however, add a very distinctive voice to the cacophony of sounds and melodies that constitute the psychoanalytic movement.

Conclusion

Attachment theory provides a coherent, experience near, and empirically supported view of normal and pathological developmental processes and clinical phenomena. Attachment theory, however, never intended to be a comprehensive view of human development, nor a theory that attempts to explain the enormous variety of clinical phenomena observed in the practice of psychoanalysis. Attachment theory is one of many psychoanalytic traditions, and needs to integrate its understanding of development with the clinical insights developed over the course of 100 years of psychoanalysis.

In line with our thoughts in regard to paradigm shifts, we are advocating that integrative attempts begin by a thoughtful and careful analysis of the similarities and differences of basic premises that underlie the understanding of clinical phenomena and clinical interventions among different psychoanalytic traditions. We think that attachment theory, built on modern biological concepts and a strong and growing empirical base offers an indispensable platform from which to launch efforts of integration. This integration however, should not be limited to psychoanalysis and must remain interdisciplinary. Indeed, the greatest strength of attachment theory is that it is interdisciplinary, and the cross-fertilization of attachment theory with other fields of knowledge, such as developmental psychopathology, neuroscience and anthropology, is paying huge dividends. Witness for instance the work of integration between attachment theory and neurobiology (Schore 1994, 1996, 2002; Siegel, 1999), attachment and developmental psychopathology (Sroufe 1989, 1990a; 1997; Sroufe, Egeland & Carlson 1999), and the comparative study of attachment in different cultural settings (van IJzendoorn & Sagi 1999). We also think there is also a remarkable congruence between the theoretical and the clinical implications of attachment theory (Cortina & Marrone 2003).

We hope this article will help not only psychoanalytically informed clinicians, but psychotherapists of all stripes to appreciate, recognize and make use of the depth, richness, and enormous clinical utility of attachment theory. Nothing would have pleased Bowlby more than to see attachment theory returning to its clinical roots.

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