The Search for Identity in the Being Mode

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Introduction

I aim to enquire into the relationship between the individuation process and identity understood as experience of self in psychoanalysis. In particular I am interested in an idea of identity which may be experienced but which is alienated into an inanimate thing at the moment in which one seeks to possess it.

I assume the viewpoint of the analyst’s awareness while working, in such a way as to see analytic attention oscillate in its intensity from one to the other of the two people in the session. The adopted viewpoint means taking into consideration not the psychoanalysis of a patient as a subject to be analysed but the psychoanalytic process that involves both analyst and analysand. Analysis of the analysand’s persona also and inevitably becomes analysis of the analyst’s. To this end I distinguish two experiential positions in permanent mutual dialectic: the here-and-now of the session and the there-and-then of the analysand’s life. To consider the past in the present, and the elsewhere here, generates dialectic polarities which may help in tracing the meaning of the analyst’s presence at the session and illuminating the aspect of relational experience with the analysand.

My fixed reference point is Erich Fromm’s clinical theory as stated in his collected works (1980-81), in some posthumous works edited by Rainer Funk (Fromm, 1992, 1993, 1994) and in the unpublished Seminar held in Mexico City, 1968. Within this fixed theoretical base I propose to set out the whole of Fromm’s psychoanalysis on the most mature and highest results of his thought: the concepts of having mode and being mode.

I am constantly on guard that psychical and spiritual processes be interpreted in dialectical terms in order to avoid as much as possible schematic methods that not only block the flow of thought but also turn into over-rigid clinical practices.

Individuation Process and Identity

There are philosophers who smile to themselves when they come up against a word like identity, understood in the sense of who one is. I should like to maintain such an interior smile throughout my enquiry, which sets out by presenting the individuation process as a road of research and experimentation regarding one’s own unique and unrepeatable identity.

The most important psychoanalytic theories on the individuation process are those of Jung, Fromm and Margaret Mahler. The last-named (Mahler & Pine & Bergman, 1975) goes into great detail but is restricted to the first two years of life. Moreover I feel that it contains disproportion between a highly developed technical vision and a corresponding general theory of the
human being. In fact I believe that psychoanalytical affirmations should be founded, in an aware and intentional manner, on philosophical premises that are made as plain as possible.

Jung’s vision (1916/28, 1921, 1944, 1961) is very powerful for its interconnection between individuation process and symbols. The fascination of the Jungian approach derives from the welding of an original reading of the boundless alchemical phenomenon – an interpretation which I feel cannot be left out of consideration – to the search for Self. Critical comparison of the Jungian and Frommian approaches certainly merits a separate study.

From his works one may summarise Fromm’s vision of the individuation process as follows. The latter emerges directly as an intrinsic alternative to the „human situation“ resulting from evolution of the primates. Two tendencies – increasingly less instinctive behaviour and the growth of the brain, especially the neocortex – have meant that the primate man is equipped with minimum instincts and maximum cerebral development (Fromm, 1973, p. 201). This singular biological development becomes the contradictory datum of the human situation: to be part of nature and at the same time transcend it, precisely due to weak instincts and an awareness of self that is foreign to all other animals. In the human being the harmony of the natural state is broken and its place taken by conflict (Fromm, 1947, pp. 29 and ff.).

From the fracture that exists within human beings there derives a fundamental „existential dichotomy“: to go forward, which is to say achieve individuation, or to regress (Fromm, 1955). The process of individuation means increasingly accentuating the specific human being of the situation who pays for every step of independence with solitude in nature and also in the social group he belongs to, a solitude faced with inevitable anguish. Viewed in this way freedom and anguish are the same thing. Cutting off from the primary bond produces anguish while it liberates. Along the road to individuation the human being achieves degrees of freedom that permit him to love, giving freedom the aspect of joy. Anguish and joy turn on the same hub, the freedom deriving from the road to individuation.

Alternatively the „escape from freedom“ (Fromm, 1941) is the regressive response to the fear of that solitude which is the inevitable price of individuation. Going back is the search for an impossible refuge in a pre-human state or even an impossible return to the womb. Another regressive response is to remain fixated on the breast and its symbols. The extreme regressive destinations, which cannot be reached, are replaced by the continuation of incestuous symbiosis, by the sadomasochistic relationship, by the indifference of emotional detachment, by destructiveness.

In Fromm, then, the individuation-regression dichotomy expresses the permanent, root-conflict of human existence, the dramatic question that substantiates human nature (Fromm, 1941, 1947, 1955, 1973). As „existential dichotomy“ it regards every moment of life, although the idea of the individuating psycho-evolutionary process is set out in more comprehensible terms starting from childhood.

The beginnings of the individuation process are described by Fromm (1941, p. 235) as the first steps a child takes to loosen its symbiotic bonds with the family figures around it who give the child so much security. Dramatic steps because the first taste of one’s individuality means already experiencing radical uniqueness, since each person is alone in the whole cosmos in the sense that another person precisely the same does not exist.

In this situation the „basic anxiety“ or „primary anxiety“ is that of separation (Fromm 1959, p. 16) which may appear in various ways. Separation anguish may manifest itself as a specific human fear, the fear of living, of facing the movement there is in life, of accepting life’s risks, with awareness of one’s uniqueness which is felt as frightening solitude. Fear of solitude, inevitable price of individuation, is rooted in the human situation.

In Fromm’s view individuation does not regard only childhood, since birth is a continuous process: „I feel we are ‘born’ every moment“ (Evans, 1966, p. 24). Therefore, „at every moment we are faced with a question: Should we return, or should we develop?“ (Ibid., pp. 24-5). Development is a biophilic wager.

A keystone in Fromm concerns the idea of
the individual and his uniqueness. Unlike Sullivan, for whom „the self may be said to be made up of reflected appraisals“ (1953, p. 22), Fromm held that the uniqueness of the individual was a genetically based reality. It follows from this that the psychoanalytic work should reconstruct the picture of the analysand’s character at birth in order to be able to distinguish, in his current situation, the original traits from those acquired under the influence of his surroundings (Fromm, 1979, p. 310).

Fromm was convinced that there exists an original face of the person at birth. „In other words, I think a person, in the lottery of the chromosomes, is already conceived as a very definite being“ (1991, p. 594). This is a point which he recurrently affirmed and which contributes to making him a figure apart on the interpersonal psychoanalysis scene. On the other hand, to remove any doubt, it must be said that Fromm did not intend to hypostatise an idea of innate identity – constitutional and describable – which once found permits us to say: look, this is me, made in such and such a way. The being mode gives us back the intimate problematic nature of the relationship between individuation process and identity.

Having Mode and Being Mode
In the Psychoanalytic Work

After a lifetime dedicated to psychoanalysis Erich Fromm wrote „To Have or to Be?“, published in 1976. He often stated that his theories were based on clinical experience, and in fact we may note that gradually, from the 40’s, his pages or propositions dealing with the psychoanalytic work converge in defining an „orientation centred on possession“ and an „orientation centred on activity“. These two orientations are precursors of the high Frommian elaboration that was to culminate in the psychodynamic presentation of the „having mode“ and in the delineation of a therapeutic and trans-therapeutic psychoanalytic work aimed at favouring experience of the „being mode“ and the search for one’s own non-alienated identity.

As regards Fromm’s whole psychoanalytic theory, I propose considering it from the viewpoint of his most mature positions on the having mode and being mode. What I suggest is an anticipatory perspective, so that everything Fromm stated on the theme of psychoanalysis is seen to be heading towards the theoretical and mystical peak of his 1976 book. We are dealing with a unifying light which lets us glimpse the thread that runs through Fromm’s work and gives a systematic quality to all his psychoanalytic teachings.

In the absence of a book on technique – which he chose not to write – we risk reducing Fromm’s psychoanalytic contribution to a list of propositions taken from one book or another, from this or that clinical seminar, a not very organic collection of citations. Even his pupils’ invaluable contribution in the oral tradition risks getting lost in a mixture of memories and anecdotes. Whereas an interpretative operation in the „future perfect“, a structuring interpolation, permits us to grasp the ongoing unity of Frommian clinical thought, its converging at the highest point of arrival.

The expression „future perfect“ was suggested by Adam Schaff (1960, p. 193) as a method of interpreting the work of Marx with view to bringing the value of his youthful writings into the overall framework of his thought in which the more mature works, developing earlier insights, might illuminate and give full meaning to those still unripe. In the context of the lively Marxist debate of the early 60’s, the „future perfect“ method was criticised by Althusser (1961/1965) who distinguished a Marxist Marx from a not yet Marxist Marx. Schaff (1965) defended his theories and argued that at bottom they were an extension of criteria of method adopted by Marx himself, in accordance with which the capitalistic way of production, being formed subsequently and more complexly, explained the feudal and ancient ways of production, just as human anatomy was the key to that of the apes.

I am aware of the arbitrary nature of my application of the „future perfect“ method to the affirmations and steps of Frommian clinical theory prior to the 1976 book. I assume responsibility as scholar and psychoanalyst. But in this way the outline of Fromm’s contribution to psychoanalysis seems clearer and of evident gener-
osity. It reminds me of Ferenczi’s which poured all its invigoration into psychoanalysis without getting closed off in school sectarianism. These two authors offered psychoanalysis not only theoretical and technical developments but also, and firstly, a tone, a style and a light that gives depth and perspective to the whole. A light that shows us the psychoanalytic universe not as a rigidified tangle of mutually contradictory theories but as a live and pulsating body in permanent ferment and development.

The psychoanalyst who chooses Fromm as author of reference renounces belonging to any defined school in the sense of a doctrinal framework that embraces and reassures, taming any doubt. He renounces an identity definition which in setting forth his particulars takes away his most indivisible and ineffable identity. Fromm (1958) attacked the „party line“ in psychoanalysis. He stated: „I have never wanted to found a school of my own“ (Roazen, 2001, p. 36). He did not want his teachings to be rigidified into crystallised rules (Lesser, 1992) and he refuted dogma and ritual in analysis (Kwawer, 2002, p.623).

One point is clear: in a humanistic perspective the task of psychoanalysis is to combat alienation, but it may become alienated itself in its technique if the latter should be codified in terms that are standardised and hypostatised in themselves. This to such an extent that we should substitute a „question of technique“ for the theme of technique understood as apparatus of procedures, that is, a questioning of the rules to be handed down from one generation of analysts to the next (Biancoli, 2005). Another parallel with Marx: the subtitle of „Capital“ is not „A Treatise on Political Economy“ but „A Critique of Political Economy“. It seems to me that we should posit the theme of psychoanalytic technique in the same way: a questioning, which means not refusal but critical vision.

The theoretical perspective I am outlining commits psychoanalysis to the here-and-now of the session experienced in the being mode. The difficult art of avoiding capture by the having mode during the analytic work travels the road opened up by interpersonal psychoanalysis which, according to Mitchell (1997, p. 84), is distinguished from classic analysis because it shifts emphasis from the theres-and-thens of the analysand’s life to the here-and-now of the session.

In the having mode the affective accent of experience is placed on peripheral aspects of self, on the things one has, one’s own body, one’s skills etc. The person’s identity tends to be found in a storehouse of things. The past becomes a series of facts, an inventory of events and possessions, a constellation of theres-and-thens, hypostatised, describable and classifiable. What is lacking is love of life, trust in its unpredictable movements, tremors and pulsations.

The being mode does not lend itself well to description in words, both because the historically given languages have assigned it few words and because it does not consist of solely intellect and thought that may be verbalised. The movement of experience proper to it eludes logical-formal conceptualisation. Intellectual content is certainly not excluded from the being mode but is not enough to represent it, since it unites reason and emotion, word and silence. A fundamental statement by Fromm (1976, p. 361) maintains that this spiritual experience is not outside time yet is not governed thereby. Whereas the having mode comes under chronological time and sees the present as an extension of the past, felt as a warehouse of memories. One possesses memories just as one possesses things.

Chronological time is conventional time, the time of the calendar and timetables, measurable by the clock. The psychoanalytic work is carried out by means of consecutive appointments: the days of the week and the times in the analyst’s diary are the same as those in the analysand’s. But then, in the session, while the analyst’s watch shows chronological time minute by minute, each minute with its same sixty seconds, an experiential time rolls on which now slows down, now speeds up, sometimes seeming to stop, expanding to the infinite, and other times the session is over in a flash. Time of this kind offers the prairies of the spirit to the being mode, permits the boldest adventures of the soul, but always within the hour of the analyst’s watch. I feel that this is a possible meaning of Fromm’s statement about the being mode and time: it is not outside time yet is not governed
thereby.

**Achievable Identities**

Fromm makes a distinction between „Ego“ and „I“ (1968a). The Ego is illusory since it exists only from the viewpoint of the having mode. The Ego, as socially connotated reification of our identity, belongs to the having mode and is a thing, a possession, a pseudo-identity, „the mask we each wear“, „a dead image“. Now, if psychoanalysis is a dialogue between analyst and analysand aimed at establishing who the latter is and why he is the way he is, and if the process remains in the having mode, the identity by which one may be recognised is resolved into certain data constant in the succession of events, into a picture of character traits that explains symptoms, that is to say in possession of a logical scheme which links everything in accordance with cause-effect connections in temporal progression. It may be a well constructed pseudo-identity designed to placate the anguish of separation and suited to functioning in a society oriented towards the having mode. All psychotherapy aimed at adapting the individual to society leads to pseudo-identity.

Since it is a thing, the Ego is describable in words, whereas the I is not wholly describable and not subject to full conceptual representation (1976). The I emerges in the being mode as total and immediate experience of being an active functioning centre that tends to be lived in its wholeness, which includes relationship with the world and also perception of the body as experience and not as mere thought thereof. Emergence of the I is impeded by the fear of solitude that is felt through experiencing oneself as a unique individual. Fear of life too may be seen as fear of individuation in one’s own uniqueness. The process of individuation, as a road from unity with the mother’s womb to the experience of one’s own uniqueness, culminates in the I. It is an acceptance of the wave of life. One doesn’t know where it is leading, but one knows it is alive and in movement.

In this perspective the analyst’s Ego may permit itself a traditional technical approach, with the classic rules of neutrality, anonymity and abstaining, but only with difficulty will a fine, subtle interpersonal interaction be achieved. The analysand may even feel himself described, interpreted and reconstructed, and may even agree about the accuracy of these operations, but he will feel that his interior face, exquisitely unique, has remained inexplicably elusive. In fact the quiver of life in which a person’s identity lies cannot be grasped, cannot be possessed, cannot be retained in the memory as a concept: it eludes all means of appropriation. It is generated moment by moment, always new and always the same, in the experience of being. It follows that the experience Fromm calls „I“, the „I“ which cannot be captured, comes about in the here-and-now. The analytic situation in the here-and-now is one that brings two people face to face in the present. If flights into the there-and-then, hypostatised and subsisting in themselves, are brought into the here-and-now, the mask of the Ego ends up by cracking and lets the I shine through. It is precisely the I, in putting itself forward and removing itself, which is the landing-stage experience in the individuation process.

In psychoanalysis every insight of identity, every awareness of self just achieved, is alienated, dries up and hardens into a dead thing if it loses its fresh character of living experience and is capitalised. The identity achieved in the being mode is lived in all its truth, but if it is affectively invested as substance in itself it is alienated into fetish. Psychoanalysis should know that the identity it discovers in a person is volatile and remains alive only in the act of its being carried out, even when the pseudo-identities within that person have been dispelled. This is why recovering one’s own nature at birth, which is a great operation of truth, does not mean glimpsing one’s own ultimate identity if this nature becomes a psychological icon in which to see oneself, something to hang on to in the belief of having at last understood who one is. The more accentuated the hanging on to that self image believed to be the most truthful, the more this image falls into the realm of possession and ownership.

The resulting identity, which in its own dialectic movement we encounter in psychoanalysis, will remain until a formal definition is at-
tempted that congeals it into a pseudo-identity. Pseudo-identity is narcissistic.

Although I greatly appreciate Erikson’s fundamental 1963 text „Childhood and Society“, Kohut’s theories (1971, 1977) and the recent emphases on dissociation which come to hypothesising the multiplicity of the Self (Bromberg, 1996), I prefer to stick to the Frommian vision. In the language I use here, these authors are dealing with pseudo-identity. Whereas it seems to me that we may make a parallel between the Frommian approach and Winnicott’s „False Self“ and „True Self“ distinction (1960).

The point lies in the elusiveness of the I. It may be experienced without being seized, without being detained. It can be talked about only in allusive, metaphorical terms. Having lived the experience of the I, its evolutionary value lies in the achieved awareness that it is possible.

Fromm echoes Meister Eckhart. In the Sermon Beati pauperes spiritu, Meister Eckhart explains the most radical concept of poverty of spirit in which all narcissism and pseudo-identities are abandoned. „...a poor man is he who wants nothing, knows nothing, has nothing“ (Meister Eckhart, 1985, p. 131).

**The Here-and-Now in Analysis**

My considerations are aimed at the analyst’s awareness while he is working. The analyst’s interior attitude structures the relationship far more than explicit interpretations and invita-
tions which on the one hand risk inducing sterile indoctrinations and on the other hand letting through an unconscious moral sadism. Much depends on the sensitivity and empathy of the analyst who communicates with discrete words, sometimes with metaphors (Ingram, 2005), a delicate, respectful and emotionally appropriate closeness (Ehrenberg, 1992; Beebe & Lachmann, 2002). An ossified pain may thus find an alternative in tears and in the veiled light that comes to the eyes. Psychoanalysis is art.

The analyst must see to it that every analysis is unique with view to advancing the process of individuation in both members of the analytic couple, since uniqueness and individuation are features of the same surfacing movement of the experience of the I. Every here-and-now is always unique and always alive. The elusive identities of analyst and analysand flash in the breaths of the here-and-now.

The analytic dialogue is based on emotional responses and reactions communicated reciprocally, and the analyst reacts emotionally and communicates his reaction to what the analysand communicates (Fromm, 1968b). So the analyst’s own process of individuation is also activated and he comes increasingly to know himself through the analytic relationship (Groddeck, 1926; Searles, 1972; Casement, 1985; Dupont, 1988; Aron, 1991, 1992; Blechner, 1992).

The analyst hears not only the patient but also himself in the act of discovering his own humanity in the other, of experiencing the universal human in himself and the other. Distorted visions and objective visions on both parts are alternated and intersect. There is a flow of interweaving between the two aspects and the road towards individuation proceeds between pseudo-identities and subtle, fleeting perceptions of true identity, always withdrawing at any hint of possession. Seeing ourselves in possessive terms is a permanent temptation that tells us how easy it is to be taken by the having mode. It is easy to be distracted from the here-and-now and the being mode which alone can give that experience which may be lived but not captured. It is the act of seizing in order to hold back that makes the experience vanish.

The terms „here-and-now“ and „there-and-then“ are found in the literature of psychoanaly-
sis, but nor very frequently (Tauber, 1959; Wol-
data2004). The here-and-now of the session is at once a concept, a way of feeling, a situation and a spiritual position, which is to say a global experience under way. The there-and-then also involves an experiential complexity that includes intellect, affect, emotions. The two experiences are highly mobile and often pass unnoticed from one to the other. Moreover, the products of the unconscious such as dreams, unfulfilled actions or witticisms do not respect the distinction be-
tween here-and-now and there-and-then but mix up their elements in the most varied ways. Distinction between the two experiences is hard, though perhaps simple on the terminological plane. In a first approximation we may posit this distinction from a static viewpoint, in the knowledge however that we are dealing with a methodological expedient that disengages from the very rapid, sometimes lightning shifting of contents from one type of experience to the other. A definition of the there-and-then may be inferred, by process of elimination, with regard to definition of the here-and-now. The meaning of the there-and-then refers to all experiences, all people, situations, happenings, dreams and fantasies of the past in realities other than the reality of the analyst and analysand in the session. It is a non-here-and-non-now.

Furthermore, the movement of psychogenesis brings the past into the present, and the complex intermingling and causal links of psychodynamics bring the there here. Thus if the there-and-then is also an experience, it is so only now and here. It is now and here that we are alive. Valuation of the here-and-now responds to a biophilic feeling which does not rest on the elsewhere or on the past but entrusts itself to the act of living and stands as a condition for experience of the I.

In the whirl of mental content one may set a fixed point: at this moment I can experience every elsewhere only here, and every past and future exists as present thought, imagination and feeling. In an ontological sense any other time and any other place may be thought of, represented and felt only now, here. This does not remove the empirical datum that the there-and-then is rarely an experience that docilely lets itself be circumscribed within the here-and-now: indeed it tends to invade the latter and put itself forward as reality.

I believe that the there-and-then, if not recognised as existing only and inasmuch as it is here-and-now, may be considered an experience of alienation, unobservable while it is being lived and therefore unconscious in its alienated nature. Plunging into the there-and-then, losing awareness that it is a psychic event possible only in the present moment and place, is a very frequent and widespread experience because it is covered by common sense.

One may state that humanism sees truth living in the here-and-now and sees illusions in the there-and-then. Humanists refute all forms of idolatry and alienation, two terms which Fromm (1955, pp. 88-109) sees as closely related.

**Dialectic of Humanism in Psychoanalysis**

Bringing all the content of the there-and-then into the here-and-now should be seen in dialectical terms, that is, as a polarity which does not surrender to its opposite, moreover irreducible in putting itself forward in images, symbols, fetishes. No fundamentalism is compatible with the being mode and the here-and-now. Indeed, bringing every elsewhere here and every other time into the present requires watchful and flexible work, in an ongoing refinement of humanism.

The language of symbols and metaphors belongs as much to psychoanalysis as it does to humanism. It could not be otherwise if Groddeck (1922) is right in maintaining that human beings are compulsive with regard to symbolisation. We can interpret symbols, clarify them. Sometimes we can free ourselves of them, while other times it is they that free us. In the search for Self, Jung let himself be guided by symbols. In a Frommian perspective a symbol or a metaphor may allude to or announce the identity of a person or even, I think, protect it through concealment.

A symbol may function as a bridge between here-and-now and there-and-then, but if a powerful passion is involved it may happen that the there-and-then becomes an irresistible pole of attraction. Often there-and-then events resist melting into the here-and-now. A dream brought up in analysis may assail the analyst with very, very intense images. Dream symbols concern as much the dreamer’s unconscious as his analyst’s. Sometimes it is as if a great wind rises up and carries both away. It takes both of them to a there-and-then which exists ontologically only here-and-now, but they forget this because they enter a world of images that are too powerful or too evocative or fascinating or
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— why not? — terrifying. This too is courage: to follow the drifting of a spell. There are explorers who do not return. Those who return recount their adventure and bring it here into the present. All is human, even the arcane is human, acknowledged and experienced in the being mode, undergone with dismay in the having mode. The search for the analysand’s identity may follow unusual paths that are also unknown to the analyst. I am not convinced by a humanism that is reduced to a projective mechanism in accordance with the thesis that religions, myths and art are projections of human interior realities. Humanism, if it is radical, is acknowledged as figurative, productive and constructive more than projective, creative in such a way that creation takes an unexpected configuration, follows paths that were not known to exist, moved by who knows what engine. Characters in fiction have this in common with characters in dreams: they do what they want, they are autonomous with regard to their creator’s will. And this is not alienation but the life of the spirit which the psychoanalytic comparison seeks to understand and express in words, as far as this is possible. Sometimes there are no words, but understanding is achieved just the same through mutual empathy and reciprocal recognition of identity. In these moments transference and countertransference are laid aside, leaving analyst and analysand to face one another in their undistorted human reality. In other moments transference and countertransference rise up impetuously and tend to confuse, overlap, distort and misrepresent. It is quite true that transference and countertransference are idolatries (Fromm, 1982; Biancoli, 1998). But how much power they have! How powerful idols are! They are the ones who largely make history, even though humanists never tire of pointing them out and unmasking them. Humanist denunciation however is not iconoclastic. It never is. It is never fundamentalist. Iconoclasm, like idolatry, puts all the affective accent on the idol, on representation, and neglects the human condition that permits or has need of the idol.

The analyst does not hit out at transference, does not destroy but analyses it, clarifying, distinguishing, demonstrating how it induces a “strong sense of topicality” in infantile schemes and content (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967, p. 609). Transference may be considered an intrusion into the here-and-now of the session on the part of a repetitive there-and-then of figures from the past who reappear. Once again, what is at stake is the identity of both members of the analytic couple. The analyst may be seduced by the transference and therefore taken far from himself so he is incapable of orienting the analysand with regard to the nature of feelings experienced. But if the analyst holds on to the idologic vision of transference and countertransference he is aided in realising how the here-and-now gets continually lost in the there-and-then. The distorting solicitations are present in both analyst and analysand. It is the analyst’s task to carry out a very subtle operation not only on the other but also on himself, since transference is a human phenomenon that affects everyone.

Conclusion

The analyst may promise the analysand a way to seek his identity, but the promise should be strictly formulated in the sense that both set out to seek their own identities (Akeret, 1995). The analyst’s awareness and expertise that help the analysand regard the fact that having been touched by one’s own identity does not mean possessing it. The manifest analytic work turns on the analysand’s life, but in this life being discussed at this moment two experiences occur which intersect, now rising into the being mode and now falling into the having mode, jointly or separately, in accordance with dialectical interweaving and overturning.

The history of psychoanalysis is inseparable from the culture of the 20th century. It happened that the subject believed himself to be separate from the object and capable of analysing the latter as such. Then the illusion was destroyed with the realisation that the fact and experience of the fact are indivisible and are generated in turn. Accent shifted from the there-and-thens scattered throughout the analysand’s life to the here-and-now as an experience co-produced in
the session. This vision was adopted by interpersonal and later by relational psychoanalysis. Fromm is one of its spokesmen, also at clinical level. He compared (1968b) a psychogenetic viewpoint with a functional viewpoint which are alternated in the psychoanalytic work. The former considers the life history of a person and the psychogenesis of his present aspects. The latter is transversal and looks at the functioning totality of a person in his complexities under way at a given moment. Knowledge of psychogenesis is useful, as all information is, but it is with the functional viewpoint that each aspect of the personality emerges in relation to all the other aspects, is grasped in its active function. When the potentially entire picture of a person appears one may see what function is carried out in him by the conflict between attempt at individuation and need for protection and security.

The analyst relives the same conflict in himself. Sometimes he is rewarded by the joy of overcoming it, and also by the joy of seeing the analysand overcome it.

References


